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Abstract 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most visible and contested institutions within the 
global economic governance architecture. Both proponents and opponents of trade liberalization 
regularly voice discontent with the institution’s functioning and its effect on the economies of its 
members. Of particular interest is the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), often described as 
the organization’s flagship body. The WTO DSU helps parties to settle disputes related to the 
interpretation and enforcement of the provisions drafted and agreed upon over several trade 
negotiation rounds. This paper presents a game-theoretic approach to analyze whether the WTO DSU 
ensures equal access and outcomes to all parties who are part of a trade dispute. It particularly 
addresses the costs of litigation. The paper argues that due to these issues, developing countries will not 
reap equal benefits from the usage of the WTO DSU as their developed counterparts. Developing 
countries will, due to a relative higher cost of WTO litigation, be worse off, both as a plaintiff and as a 
defendant. They will file less complaints and settle for less beneficial outcomes. We also find that 
bilateral settlement is a very important feature in the WTO DSU.  
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1. An introduction to the WTO DSU 
Over the last decades, international trade has flourished. Nowadays, most goods and services cross 
several borders from the place of production to the place of final consumption. Due to the increase in 
international trade, countries felt the need to establish rules on the conduct of international trade 
transactions. These rules are often stipulated in bilateral or multilateral trade agreements, which codify 
attempts of countries to mutually restrain the degree of their trade interventions (Staiger, 1994:3). 
Parties to trade agreements thus trade off national sovereignty for adherence to an international 
agreement, allowing for mutual beneficial trade liberalization. The World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
1994 successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is currently the main 
international agreement and organization dealing with international trade. More specifically, the WTO 
provides countries with a forum for the negotiation of trade liberalizations and trade rules that stipulate 
the conduct of countries in international trade. 
However, under some circumstances individual countries face an incentive to install WTO-inconsistent 
measures in order to reap terms-of-trade gains, due to domestic pressure for example (Staiger and 
Tabellini, 1987; Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998; Beshkar, 2010; Horn, Maggi and Staiger, 2010), or due 
to disagreement on or uncertainty about the interpretation of the WTO concessions and provisions 
(Maggi, 1999; Bagwell and Staiger, 2002: 40, 96; Maggi and Staiger, 2011). In order to curb these 
protectionist reflexes, countries need to be informed about and, if necessary, punished for non-
adherence to the WTO agreements (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999; Bown, 2004). This is why a procedure for 
the interpretation and enforcement of trade agreements has become indispensable or “the backbone of 
the multilateral trading system”.1  
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which was annexed to the WTO agreements, is in 
this sense the ‘crown jewel’ of the multilateral trade regime (Esserman and Howse, 2003:131) and “is a 
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system” (WTO DSU, 
Art. 3.2).2 One of the most profound changes at the establishment of the WTO was indeed the 
strengthening and unification of the GATT’s dispute settlement procedures.3 This has given rise to a 
                                                          
1 Mike Moore, WTO’s Unique System of Settling Disputes Nears 200 Cases in 2000, Press Release, 5 June 2000. 
2 The WTO DSU is under review during the Doha Round negotiations, see Bagwell (2008) for an analysis of some 
proposals. 
3 These changes include: the omission of the unanimity rule for adopting panel reports, the establishment of an 
Appellate Body, the unification of the dispute settlement, and strict timelines for WTO proceedings compared to 
the long GATT process. 
3 
 
steep increase in the number of cases compared to the GATT-era.4 In contrast to most other 
international organizations that rely on diplomatic means to resolve conflicts, the changes in its dispute 
settlement procedures have given the WTO ‘teeth’. The judgments of the WTO panels are elaborate and 
legally binding and can even authorize the harmed party to install countervailing measures to 
compensate for the loss of market access.  
The changes in dispute settlement have resulted in a more rule-oriented approach, which presumably 
reinforced equality among WTO members (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002, 38; Busch and Reinhardt, 2003: 
143; Holmes, Rollo and Young, 2003).5 Conventional wisdom indeed suggests that binding, impartial 
third-party arbitration rules out power differences between members and hence helps to level the 
playing field. For instance, even the smallest WTO member can ensure that large economies such as the 
United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) adhere to their trade liberalization 
concessions. As put by Lacarte-Muró and Gappah (2000: 400): “The [DSU] works to the advantage of all 
members but it especially gives security to the weaker members who, in the past, often lacked the 
political or economic clout to enforce their rights and their interests”. The question we address is 
whether the DSU indeed ensures equal opportunities and outcomes for all its members.  
This is even more crucial since developing countries are increasingly important players within the 
international trade regime. For example, in 2013, developing countries accounted for 42% of all trade in 
goods and 35% of all trade in services (WTO, 2013). When we look at the WTO dispute cases, we can see 
that developed economies are the main users (about 67% of both plaintiffs and respondents are 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries). Taking into 
account their trade volume, this seems like a reasonable good fit. However, the non-OECD countries also 
include countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China. These countries might still be in the list of the 
lower- or upper-middle-income economies, but they have invested in plenty of resources to use during 
WTO litigation. These investments mean that they are rather prepared to engage in WTO litigation, and 
that doing so does not pose a large financial burden any more. Essentially, the vast majority of 
developing country cases are launched by 5 countries (Brazil, India, Thailand, China, and Argentina). 
More strikingly, more than 60 developing countries that are members of the WTO have never been 
                                                          
4 There have been 486 cases from its establishment till December 2014, compared to fewer than 300 cases in the 
47-years GATT history. 
5 A rules-based approach make governments agree upon a set of rules or principles. As a result, power 
asymmetries between countries are expected to play a diminished role. Moreover, the principles of reciprocity and 
nondiscrimination further lower power asymmetries (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002: 5 and 8).  
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involved in WTO adjudication.6 The relative sizes of the trade volume are unsatisfying as an explanation 
for why the developed economies are more active in WTO litigation. Developing countries are also 
trading extensively, and can be assumed to face adverse trade policies to the same extent. The volume 
of their trade might be smaller, but trade is the main pathway to these countries’ economic growth and 
development  
The database established by Horn and Mavroidis (2011) allows for a quick overview of the number of 
complaints filed by developing and developed countries from the establishment of the WTO in 1994 
until 2011 (dispute 426). Table 1 shows the number of complaints filed by and against these two types 
of countries, based on the WTO self-classification.  
Table 1: Number of disputes of developed/developing countries as plaintiffs/defendants 
Number of disputes Developed Defendant Developing Defendant Total 
Developed Plaintiff 138 99 237 
Developing Plaintiff 112 62 174 
Total 250 161 411 
 
However, since this list includes a number of middle-income countries, Table 2 shows the number of 
disputes depending on whether the countries are member of either (or both) the Group of 20 (G-20) or 
the OECD. Both these groups gather powerful economies, and their members are well endowed with 
resources to support WTO litigation. These economies are not likely to be deterred by litigation costs. 
The numbers in Table 2 thus give a better idea of the involvement of developing countries in WTO 
dispute settlement than the ones in Table 1. 
Table 2: Number of disputes of OECD/G20 member countries vs non-OECD/G20 member countries. 
Number of disputes OECD/G20 Defendant Non-OECD/G20 Defendant Total 
OECD/G20 Plaintiff 326 24 350 
Non OECD/G20 Plaintiff 46 15 61 
Total 372 39 411 
 
These Tables clearly indicate that developed countries file more complaints, and act more often as 
defendants within the WTO. In particular, very few disputes are initiated or responded to by non-
                                                          
6 For an early review, see Abbott (2007). 
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OECD/G20 countries. As this paper demonstrates, the disparity in the extent to which parties are part of 
the WTO litigation process can be explained by the cost of WTO litigation. This cost is modelled as the 
cost of pursuing a single dispute, but might as such be higher when the country involved did not yet 
build up any experience in dealing with the WTO DSU. Consequently, the cost of litigation comprises 
both the cost related to preparing a single dispute and the fixed cost of being an active participant in 
WTO dispute settlement. Developing countries often lack the resources to litigate, which is even higher 
for them since they lack the experience and the basis of human knowledge to be an active participant.   
The Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) can to a certain extent support developing countries to use 
the DSU. It provides legal support at discounted rates. However, as shown in Van Kerckhoven (2015), so 
far, the establishment of the ACWL has not had a significant effect on the actions taken by developing 
countries within the WTO. There are additional costs to preparing a case that are not alleviated by the 
ACLW. This paper studies how the cost of litigation, and the differences in the financial resources of the 
parties involved in a WTO dispute affect the decisions of countries within the WTO.   
The focus of this paper is on the different outcomes realized by countries well-endowed with resources 
in order to prepare a case for WTO litigation (for clarity and simplicity referred to as developed 
economies) compared with those countries that are rather WTO litigation resource-scare (for clarity and 
simplicity called developing economies). The paper hence subscribes to the view of the DSU as an 
enforcement device rather than its role as an informational device. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a literature review. Next, we propose a 
game-theoretical model of the DSU that studies the actions taken by countries within the DSU. Section 
four deals more elaborately with the question of inequality within the DSU and provides an 
interpretation of the findings resulting from the game-theoretical model. We end with a brief 
conclusion. We show that a relatively high cost of litigation affects the strategies of the parties during 
WTO litigation. The paper further demonstrates the importance of bilateral settlement, even though this 
feature is unable to offset the negative effects of litigation for developing countries. These countries 
might even adapt their policies initially so as to deter any WTO complaints. This stands in striking 
contrast with the financially well-endowed economies who are able to get away with policies 
inconsistent with their WTO commitments. 
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2. Literature Review 
Classic economic theory suggests that countries can gain from trade agreements reducing trade 
barriers.7 Reciprocity is the key incentive to trade liberalization and is as such also the cornerstone of 
the WTO regime. However, concluding reciprocal negotiations is greatly obstructed when countries fear 
that the other party could cheat on the agreement and impose trade restrictions, such as import taxes, 
limiting the market access for its exporting industries (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002: 6). In a way, this is a 
classic prisoners’ dilemma that obstructs the furthering of international trade and its liberalization. A 
first way to ease the fear of non-compliance, is to allow parties to self-enforce the agreement. Parties 
could reply in a reciprocal tit-for-tat manner to the agreement-inconsistent trade policies of their 
trading partners. However, this requires all members to the trade agreement to have significant market 
power vis-à-vis the non-complying party and leads to uncertainty and instability. 
For that reason, a more extensive structure for the litigation of trade disputes was added to the WTO 
agreements. WTO litigation can help to solve this dilemma by allowing parties to file a complaint, 
establish an impartial panel to look into the dispute and if deemed necessary force the violating party to 
reverse its policy. 
The literature on litigation is impressive and giving a complete overview of this literature is not our 
ambition. An excellent literature review dealing with litigation in general has already been provided by 
Daughety and Reinganum (2008). For a focus on international trade, see Staiger (1994). However, this 
strand of literature has not yet extensively looked into international trade litigation and the DSU. The 
next paragraphs focus on a limited number of specific papers that deserve more attention in the context 
of this particular paper.8  
A first attempt to present a game theoretical account of the WTO DSU procedures, was conducted by 
Büttler and Hausser (2000). They present an interesting but stylized account of the WTO DSU. Their 
model includes broad forms of ‘punishment’ such as reputational gains and losses. Similar to other 
papers, their paper treats the pay-offs as exogenous. Our model adds to this approach by treating the 
outcomes of the game as endogenous. More specifically, pay-offs in our paper result from distances 
                                                          
7 For an overview of economic theory and the establishment of the GATT/ WTO, see Bagwell and Staiger, 2002. 
8 Regarding the benefits of having a multilateral dispute settlement body and the WTO DSU in general, a much 
richer literature is available. 
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between an actual policy and a country’s ideal policy.  We further add an analysis of the implementation 
phase after the panel ruling.  
Reinhardt (2001) studies toothless GATT rulings and proposes an asymmetric information model to 
explain why even the threat of establishing a panel might induce a defendant to partly concede and 
make concessions even when there does not exist a formal enforcement procedure. He argues that due 
to uncertainty about the ‘type’ of the other player (rather than the policy implemented), defendants 
make greater concessions before rulings than after.  
We study a more general model and our focus is on the WTO DSU rather than the GATT. Similar to 
Büttler and Hauser (2000), the panel’s decision is not directly related to the policy set by the defendant. 
Instead they assign probabilities to the different panel outcomes.9 Bown (2002) takes a different 
approach and looks into a country’s decision to initiate WTO DSU proceedings, rather than legally adjust 
their trade policy by using the safeguard provision, allowing for a temporarily protection of a 
(potentially) harmed industry. He finds that the reforms of the WTO dispute settlement procedures have 
done little to decrease the likelihood that stronger countries proceed illegally since they have little fear 
that a smaller country will be able to retaliate strongly. Poletti, De Bièvre, and Chatagnier (2014) 
described the highly important relationship between trade liberalization negotiations and litigation. 
They argue that the ability to impose costs on the defendant through the credible threat of litigation 
opens up the bargaining horizon for trade liberalization. 
In the foregoing paragraphs we discussed theoretical papers focusing on the WTO’s dispute settlement. 
The particular ambition of this paper is to add to this research and shed light on how the cost of 
litigation determines the route a dispute takes. Several papers have described that the rather high cost 
of WTO litigation could pose a challenge for developing countries in their use of the WTO DSU, both as 
complainants and as defendants (Davis, 2012, p.8-11; Bown, 2004, 2004b, 2009, p.128; Bown and 
Hoekman, 2005; Schaffer, 2006; and Iida, 2004). Indeed, preparing a case for WTO litigation is rather 
costly. Typically, the preparation of a case for WTO litigation requires the involvement of outside 
experts, such as WTO lawyers and trade economists. These costs need to be taken into account for 
every single dispute. In addition, there is also a cost that is not specific. To take full advantage of WTO 
litigation a country needs to invest in in-house specialists that may help industries in bringing potential 
cases to its attention. Davis and Blodgett Bermeo (2009) empirically show that some countries might 
                                                          
9 Reinhardt (2001) uses a similar approach but assumes that the defendant has violated the WTO provisions. 
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lack the ability to enforce their rights in the WTO due to the high fixed costs of becoming an active 
participant in the WTO DSU. Michalopoulos (2001) adds to this account and finds that in 2000, only 30% 
of developing WTO members had the necessary staff in Geneva deemed necessary for effective 
participation in the WTO DSU. Busch, Reinhardt and Schaffer (2009)’s survey further shows that 
developing countries indeed file fewer complaints. We add to this literature by providing a formal model 
that shows what role the cost of litigation plays in determining the initiation and outcomes of WTO 
disputes.  
3. The Game-Theoretic model of the DSU 
3.1 Actors, Preferences and the Sequences of the game 
In this section we study the different steps within the DSU . The game has two players: a plaintiff and a 
defendant. Both are unitary countries and WTO members. They know the WTO provisions and the trade 
liberalization concessions to which they agreed. Both countries behave rationally and are risk-neural. 
Furthermore, we assume there is perfect and complete information. 
The issue at hand is a one-shot policy dispute. One of the WTO members has installed a trade policy that 
impairs the benefits accruing from the WTO agreements to its trading partner. The former becomes the 
defendant, the latter the plaintiff. This means that the policy implemented is inconsistent with the policy 
the defendant agreed upon during the WTO negotiation rounds. The latter policy is denoted by 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤. 
The plaintiff reclaim the harm done by this trade measure to its exporters and economy. It can challenge 
the policy set by the defendant by filing a WTO complaint.  
The policy space is one-dimensional. All variables have a value between [0,1]. In the model outlined 
below, countries’ utility functions are based upon the distance between a country’s ideal point and the 
policies realized at the different outcomes as there are no cash transfers within the WTO. Countries are 
assumed to have Euclidean preferences, namely they strictly favor a policy closer to their ideal policy. A 
higher policy, such as an import tax, results in a higher income for the violating country at the expense 
of the plaintiff. Consequently, the defendant prefers a high policy, while the plaintiff favors the lowest 
policy possible. We standardize so that the ideal policy of the defendant is equal to 1, while the plaintiff 
prefers completely free market access to the defendant’s market, hence her ideal policy is standardized 
to 0. The ideal policies also denote the extremes of the policy space.  
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A WTO dispute typically involves the following steps (WTO DSU Art.3.7) (see figure 1): 
1. One party ,the defendant, sets a policy  𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 which might be in line with the policy agreed upon 
during the WTO negotiation rounds, denoted by  𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, but might also deviate from the latter.10 
The plaintiff observes this policy.  
2. The plaintiff then has two options. She can file a complaint at the WTO, after which the game 
continues, or do nothing which gives rise to pay-offs −(0 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2; −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 for the plaintiff 
and the defendant respectively. 
3. When the plaintiff files a complaint at the WTO, the WTO provisions in first instance call upon 
the parties to hold consultations and negotiate bilaterally (WTO DSU, Art.4). This negotiation 
game is similar to the game developed by Bebchuk (1984, 407). In particular, the defendant has 
the privilege to offer a settlement, a take-it or leave-it policy 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  to the plaintiff.11 If the plaintiff 
accepts the offer, no litigation follows, and the final pay-off are −(0 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)2; −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)2. 
Otherwise the game moves on to the fourth step. We assume that pre-litigation negotiations 
are free or take place at a non-substantial minor cost. 
4. If the parties fail to agree on a settlement, WTO panels are initiated (WTO DSU Art 4.7; Art. 6, 
Art.12). Involving WTO panels comes at a cost, which is typically incurred in order to prepare the 
case for litigation. More specifically, both parties incur costs, respectively 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 and 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑. We assume 
that 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 and 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 are positive and limited so that 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 > 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝,𝑑𝑑. This ensures that no final 
policy falls outside the range between the ideal policies of both parties. We further 
assume that incurring this cost does not change the probability of a ruling in favor of the party 
incurring the cost. In the model we incorporate every cost related to the filing of a dispute. This 
includes different legal costs, personnel costs, reputational costs, and even costs related to the 
negative impact that the filing of a dispute may have on the diplomatic relations with the 
counterparty. The WTO panels have access to expert knowledge and hence have perfect 
information on 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑. If the panels rule the policy set by the defendant to be consistent with WTO 
rules, the game ends and the defendant is allowed to continue setting its policy as he initially 
did. Otherwise, the panel calls upon the defendant to reverse its policy back to the WTO levels.  
                                                          
10 Some deviations from the WTO articles are allowed under the safeguard articles GATT Art. XX and Art. XXI. Our 
approach focuses on policies not allowed under these exception articles. For more on the decision whether to 
invoke a safeguard article or proceed ‘illegally’ with the risk of facing a WTO DSU complaint, see Bown (2002).    
11 Appendix 1 describes the results for the alternative scenario in which the plaintiff proposes the settlement. 
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5. Even after the release of the panel judgment the WTO favors a solution negotiated by the 
parties to the dispute (WTO DSU Art. 3.7). Consequently, both parties can return to the 
negotiating table and find a mutually acceptable solution 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛. Again, the defendant formulates a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer, denoted by 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛.12 If the plaintiff accepts the offer, the pay-offs are 
−(0 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝; −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑. Otherwise the process moves on to the sixth step. 
6. If the negotiations fail to produce a mutually acceptable outcome, the defendant chooses 
whether to bring its legislation in line with the WTO provisions, or continue to violate the rules. 
If the defendant complies, pay-offs are −(0 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝; −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑. Otherwise the 
game moves on to the seventh step. 
7. The defendant may fail to reverse his policy to WTO levels. The plaintiff can then request the 
WTO to allow the installation of Counter-Vailing Measures (WTO DSU Art.22.6).13 The threat of 
suspension of concessions is the cornerstone of the WTO, but is also the very last resort (WTO 
DSU Art. 3.7). These CVMs allow the plaintiff to suspend concessions to the other member 
equivalent to the level of impairment or nullification of benefits caused by the defendant (WTO 
DSU Art. 22.4), so that her utility returns to the one achieved at the committed WTO levels.14 
The WTO’s dispute settlement consequently ensures that the plaintiff realizes the benefits that 
accrue from being a WTO member (𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤). If the plaintiff requests CVMs, the following pay-offs 
are realized: −(0 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 + �𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 � − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝; −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 − �𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 � − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑. If the plaintiff 
does not request CVMs, pay-offs are −(0 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝; −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑.  
 
Both parties can appeal the WTO panel’s decision. The Appellate Body then looks into the legal 
analysis of the panel, but does not to gather additional information. As the panel in this game is 
able to perfectly disclose the defendant’s policy, we do not include the Appellate Body in the 
model. 
Since we assume perfect and complete information, we use backward induction and look for sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibria. A country’s equilibrium strategy then guarantees a higher payoff (π) than any 
other strategy: 𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠1∗, 𝑠𝑠2∗) ≥ 𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2∗), with 𝑠𝑠1∗ the equilibrium strategy and 𝑠𝑠1 for every possible strategy 
                                                          
12 Appendix 1 describes the results when the plaintiff drafts the settlement offer. 
13 Literature often does not focus on this part of the WTO DSU. 
14 The exact amount of CVMs however need to be approved by the DSB. We abstract from that step and assume 
that the CVMs are such that the negative effect on the plaintiff’s economy can be offset. This way, the plaintiff is 
indifferent between CVMs and adherence, which simplifies the analysis.   
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for player 1  and  𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠1∗, 𝑠𝑠2∗) ≥ 𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠1∗, 𝑠𝑠2) with 𝑠𝑠2∗ the equilibrium strategy and 𝑠𝑠2 for every possible 
strategy for player 2.   
Figure 1: The sequence of events 
 
3.2 The equilibrium 
In the last step the plaintiff has to choose whether or not to install countervailing measures. The 
plaintiff’s pay-off from requesting CVMs is equal to −(−𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 + �𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 � − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝, which simplifies to 
−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝, while her pay-off from not installing CVMs is −𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝. As a result, requesting and 
1
•The defendant sets a policy 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑, the plaintiff observes 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑
• − − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑
2,− 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 2
2
•The plaintiff can decide to  remain at the status quo or file a complaint
•− − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑
2,− 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 2 or below
3
•Both parties can negotiate an agreement. If not, the game continues
•− − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
2,− 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 2 or below
4
•The panels release their judgment. This comes at a cost for both parties, respectively 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 and 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑
5
•Both parties can negotiate an agreement. If not, the game continues
•− − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 ,− 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 or below
6
•The defendant decides to comply, and reverses its policy to the policy agreed upon during the negotiations. If not, 
the game continues
•− − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 ,− 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 or below
7
•If the defendant fails to comply and reverse its policy to WTO levels, the plaintiff has the option to  request and 
install CVMs, which would offset the harm done to its economy or decide  to do nothing, resulting in the status 
quo
•− − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑
2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝,− 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑or − − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝,− 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑
12 
 
installing CVMs is the optimal strategy when the policy set by the defendant is higher than the one 
allowed by the WTO agreements.  
Proposition 1: If (1) the panels rules against the defendant, (2) post-panel negotiations fail, and (3) the 
defendant decides not to adhere to the WTO provisions, then the plaintiff always requests CVMs. 
In the sixth step, the defendant has the choice between reversing his policy to the WTO provisions or 
continuing the game. Continuing the game leads to CVMs. The defendant reverses his policy to the WTO 
provisions, as long as doing so guarantees a higher utility than incurring CVMs:  
−(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)2 > −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 − �𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 � 
That is, if: 
𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
2 > 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2   (1) 
When equation (1) does not hold, the defendant prefers to keep his policy as initially set and incur the 
CVMs.  
A reversal to the WTO policy is most likely when 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 = 12. This is the value that maximizes the 
lefthandside of equation (1). Similarly, countervailing measures are most likely when 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 = 12. When  
𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is located closer to 
1
2
 than is 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑, the defendant favors to adapt its policy and put it in line with the 
WTO provisions. When 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 is located closer to 
1
2
 than is 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, by contrast, the defendant prefers CVMs.  
As will be shown below, a complaint is only filed when 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 is higher than 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤. So, when 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is small, 
that is, there is a lot of trade liberalization,  and 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 is closer to 
1
2
 than is 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, the game ends in CVMs. 
When 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is equal to or larger than 
1
2
, that is, there is a lot of trade liberalization, the game ends with a 
reversal to the WTO policy. Consequently, a reversal to the WTO policy is more likely in sectors in which 
there has not been significant trade liberalizations yet. CVMs are more likely in sectors that have already 
undergone significant trade liberalizations.     
Proposition 2: Suppose that (1) the panel rules against the defendant, and (2) post-panel negotiations 
fail. Then the defendant decides to adhere to the WTO provisions, if and only if 𝒑𝒑𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 is located closer 
to 𝟏𝟏
𝟐𝟐
 than is 𝒑𝒑𝒅𝒅. Otherwise the defendant leaves his policy unaltered and the plaintiff imposes CVMs. 
Adherence is thus more likely when there is relatively little trade liberalization. 
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After the panel has released its judgment, the defendant can offer a take-it-or-leave-it proposal (𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛) to 
the defendant in the fifth step. The plaintiff accepts this offer when it provides her with a higher pay-off 
than the pay-off realized when continuing the game. This pay-off is the pay-off that corresponds to the 
WTO policy. The plaintiff thus only accepts a policy that is closer to her than the WTO policy. Similarly, 
the defendant only offers a 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 that gives him a higher pay-off than the one resulting from a continuation 
of the game. This pay-off is the pay-off that corresponds to the WTO policy, or, if the continued game 
ends with CVMs, a policy closer to him. Since the preferences of both parties are located at opposite 
sides, they prefer moves in a opposite directions. As a result, the post-panel judgment negotiations 
cannot provide both parties higher utilities than the utilities realized when the game reaches the next 
step.  
Proposition 3: After the panel rules against the defendant bilateral settlement negotiations do not 
lead to an outcome that is different from the outcome that results when the negotiations fail. Either 
the defendant adheres to the WTO policy, or the plaintiff imposes CVMs. 
The stages we discussed above take place after the WTO’s panel has released its judgment on the 
defendant’s policy. Before panels are established, the parties are called upon to engage in consultations 
and find a mutually agreeable compromise (𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) in step three. If they manage to reach a settlement, 
panels are not established and the parties thus do not have to incur the costs related to the 
establishment of the panels. Once an agreement is reached, the dispute ends and −(−𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)2,−(1 −
𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)2 are the utilities realized. The defendant makes the settlement offer. He needs to give the plaintiff 
at least her expected utility from the continuation of the game.  
The plaintiff gets a utility of −(−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 when a panel is established. Taking this into account, the 
defendant maximizes his utility and offers a settlement as close as possible to 1. He hence proposes the 
plaintiff a policy 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 that makes the plaintiff indifferent between filing a complaint and settling before 
panels are established. As a result the following must hold: 
−(−𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)2 ≥ −(−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 
This negotiated policy thus equals 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = �𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝  
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The defendant then has to determine whether this negotiated policy yields a higher utility to him than 
continuing the game. Suppose first that a continuation of the game ultimately results in CVMs. The 
defendant then prefers a settlement during consultations rather than a continuation if:  
−�1 −�𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝�2 > −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 − �𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 � − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 
This simplifies to:  
𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 > 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 − 2 ∗ ��𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝� + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝   (2) 
This equation demonstrates that pre-panel negotiations can make a difference and lead to a different 
outcome than CVMs. Settlement is favored when the costs for the defendant and the plaintiff are high. 
This shows that settlement is more likely for more costly disputes. The cost for the defendant and the 
plaintiff may depend on the sector or the specific policy measure. Certain policies may be more costly to 
unveil. Disputes related to certain sectors may be more costly if they require the gathering of very 
complex scientific evidence, as for example in the hormones disputes.  
The derivative of equation two (Eq 2) to the initial policy  demonstrates that more settlement takes 
place when the defendant’s initial policy is further away from 1
2
. 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 (2)
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑
= 2 − 4 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 
Taking the derivative for the WTO policy, results in: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 (2)
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
= 4 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
�𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 
Less trade liberalization (high 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 ) hence results in less settlement, whereas more trade liberalization 
results in more settlement.  
Suppose next that the game eventually ends with a reversal to the WTO policy. A negotiated policy is 
then agreed upon when: 
−�1 −�𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝�2 > −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 
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It is obvious that pre-panel negotiations are then always successful (since �𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 is bigger than 
𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤).   
As mentioned above pre-panel negotiations are more complex in reality. The defendant does not 
necessarily make the first proposal, and this proposal is usually not take-it-or-leave-it.  One can expect 
that the outcome of successful pre-panel consultations is located between the outcome that results 
when the defendant proposes the settlement offer, and the outcome when the plaintiff does so. See 
Appendix 1. The outcome reflects the bargaining powers of the two parties.  
Pre-panel negotiations can result in concessions from the defendant, as in Reinhardt (2001) and Busch 
and Reinhardt (2000). Whereas in their models, which study the GATT, concessions are the result of 
uncertainty about the ‘character’ of the other player, in our model they are mainly driven by the 
litigation costs.  
Proposition 4: During pre-panel negotiations the defendant and the plaintiff can often agree to a 
settlement. This is always the case if the establishment of a panel leads to the WTO policy. If the 
establishment of a panel leads to CVMs, however, whether a pre-panel settlement is reached depends 
on the actors’ costs, and the locations of the WTO policy and the defendant’s original policy. 
Negotiated outcomes reflect the bargaining powers of the parties.  
In step two the plaintiff decides whether to initiate a dispute at the WTO. Filing a complaint at the WTO 
results in a pay-off of −(−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 for the plaintiff, if the defendant drafts the pre-panel settlement 
offer. As a result, she evaluates the pay-off of initiating a WTO dispute against remaining at the status 
quo. A complaint is then filed whenever: 
−(−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 > −(−𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2  (3) 
A higher initial policy increases the likelihood that a complaint is filed. A larger cost of litigation and a 
larger policy allowed under the WTO decrease the likelihood. Complaints are filed when the cost of 
litigation is smaller than the difference between 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 and 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2  �𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 > 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝�. Thus, the plaintiff only 
files a complaint when the defendant’s policy is higher than the policy allowed under the WTO 
provisions. This does not hold though when the plaintiff has the privilege to draft the settlement offer 
during consultations. 
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Proposition 5: A lower cost of litigation for the plaintiff, a higher policy set by the defendant and a 
lower policy allowed under the WTO agreements increase the likelihood that a complaint is filed.  
In the first step the defendant chooses what policy to set. He knows that the plaintiff files as soon as 
equation (3) is satisfied. Keeping this in mind, the defendant sets his policy to give him the maximum 
utility taking into account the incentives and strategies of the plaintiff. If he wants to deter the plaintiff 
from filing, his policy can at most be �𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 . This gives the defendant a pay-off of:  
−�1 −�𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 �2 
The defendant has two options. 
First, he can set his policy so as to deter a complaint, 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 = �𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 . Second, he can set a policy that 
leads to a complaint. In this case, he puts his policy 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 > �𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 . With this policy, the plaintiff files 
a complaint at the WTO. The complaint results in CVMs when equations 1 and 2 are not satisfied.  This 
happens when −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 − �𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 � − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 > −�1 −�𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 �2 . The complaint can also 
result in settlement, this happens when either equation 1 or equation 2 is satisfied. The defendant 
choses settlement rather than a deterrence policy when −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 > −�1 −�𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 �2. 
In both these cases, the deterrence policy is more likely when the cost for the defendant is higher. 
Clearly, the structure of the DSU gives countries the opportunity to deviate from their WTO 
commitments. This is especially advantageous for the defendant if the plaintiff’s costs are high, for 
example in the case where a weak, developing country is the plaintiff. Moreover, developing countries 
can be expected to have less bargaining power than their more developed counterparts, whether they 
are the defendant or plaintiff. When they face a potential complaint from a developed trading partner, 
they may adopt an even more liberalized trade policy than the one they committed to. 
Proposition 6: The defendant will be able to deter a complaint by the plaintiff when he puts its policy 
at �𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 . With the defendant formulating the negotiation offer, the cost of the plaintiff of 
engaging in WTO litigation results in a higher utility for the defendant than he would get under the 
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WTO policy. If  the defendant sets his policy higher than �𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 , the game ends with 
countervailing measures.  
4. Implications for developing countries  
As argued above, developing countries face specific problems in dealing with the DSU, both as 
defendants and as plaintiffs. They are not able to reap similar benefits from trade adjudication as 
developed countries, which is caused by the cost of WTO litigation. However, our model also allows us 
to give some more insights in other issues as well, such as the problem of developing countries to install 
CVMs and the establishment of the ACWL.  
First, some developing countries face a relatively higher cost of litigation than developed economies and 
developing countries well-endowed with resources to bring to use in the WTO dispute settlement. Once 
a developing country decides to involve the WTO panels, it needs to devote resources in order to allow 
for litigation (Bown and Hoekman, 2005). Developing countries often do not have the same access to 
qualified and experienced people to work on the dispute. Western countries typically have a large pool 
of trained and experienced lawyers preparing the case. As demonstrated in our model, the cost of 
litigation puts a relatively high burden on developing countries, which often lack the deep pockets to 
thoroughly prepare the dispute. They are hence more likely to settle bilaterally, as Table 3 shows. Only 
in 8 instances did a non-OECD/G20 defendant not settle during the consultations.  
Table 3: Number of empaneled disputes of OECD/G20 member countries vs non-OECD/G20 member countries as 
defendants. 
Number of disputes OECD/G20 Defendant Non-OECD/G20 Defendant Total 
Settled 205 31 236 
Panel 167 8 175 
Total 372 39 411 
 
There is less discrepancy between the likelihood to settle pre-panel for developing and developed 
countries when we look at the plaintiff’s side, as we do in Table 4. This suggests that developing 
countries make a deliberate choice when they file a complaint, and that they stand ready to involve 
panels if they decide to file a complaint. Both Tables 3 and 4 also illustrate the low number of disputes in 
which developing countries take part. 
18 
 
Table 4: Number of empaneled disputes of OECD/G20 member countries vs non-OECD/G20 member countries as 
plaintiffs. 
Number of disputes OECD/G20 Defendant Non-OECD/G20 Defendant Total 
Settled 197 39 236 
Panel 153 22 175 
Total 350 61 411 
 
As shown above (see equation 3), when 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 increases, the plaintiff is less inclined to file a complaint, 
even in the case when the defendant has significantly deviated from the WTO policy. Moreover, the 
model also shows that developing countries settle for less beneficial outcomes. Indeed, when 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 gets 
higher, developing countries get a lower utility out of the consultations as plaintiffs than developed 
countries would.  
This finding is reinforced when the defendant has more negotiating power, in which case the 
consultations result in a lower utility for the developing country plaintiff. When the developing country 
defendant is able to make the settlement offer itself, which should be rather rare since the other party 
in general will has more negotiating power, they might achieve a better pay-off even though their 
relatively higher cost continues to guarantee a lower pay-off than their developed counterparts would 
achieve. 
Second, another instance where inequality between WTO members might arise is in the use of 
countervailing measures. When the plaintiff is a developing country, she might incur problems in taking 
full advantage of the CVM outcome. Installing countervailing measures against a big economy is a very 
difficult exercise for developing countries. Countervailing measures typically consist of levying a higher 
import duty on the defendant’s imports in the complainant country. For developing countries much in 
need of the imports from more advanced economies, installing such measures actually has a 
detrimental effect on their own welfare. Even more importantly, often vivid demand for the developed 
economy’s goods exist, so the countervailing measures will only have little effect on the developed 
country’s economy (Bown and Hoekman, 2005:863; Bown, 2009:134).  
The magnitude of the countervailing measures depends on the economic harm of the defendant’s policy 
on the plaintiff. Even if the harm is enormous for a developing economy, the cost of countervailing 
measures is probably not high enough to provide the incentive to stronger developed economies to 
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refrain from deviating. Consequently, the fact that countervailing measures are not really a credible 
threat to the developed economies, developing countries are much more likely to drop a case, even 
after the panels have found the developed country guilty. This is even more outspoken for certain 
developing countries that did not have to make trade liberalization concessions when joining the WTO. 
Although this provides them with much needed policy maneuver room, it makes it impossible for them 
to threat to withdraw concessions towards other economies. Without the ability to install CVMs, the 
result after the ruling by the WTO panel boils down to either reversal to the WTO policy, or the status 
quo policy.  
Table 5: Number of disputes ending with CVMs of OECD/G20 member countries vs. non-OECD/G20 countries 
members as defendants. 
Disputes OECD/G20 Defendant Non-OECD/G20 Defendant Total 
Ending with settlement 122 8 130 
Ending with CVMs 45 0 45 
Total 167 8 175 
 
Table 5 demonstrates that developing country defendants never choose the CVM option, and always 
settle a dispute after panels are established when they act as the defendant in the dispute.   
Table 6: Number of disputes ending with CVMs of OECD/G20 member countries vs. non-OECD/G20 countries 
members as plaintiffs. 
Disputes OECD/G20 Plaintiffs Non-OECD/G20 Plaintiffs Total 
Ending with settlement 110 20 130 
Ending with CVMs 43 2 45 
Total 153 22 175 
 
The same holds true for when the developing countries acts as the plaintiff (Table 6). The likelihood of 
ending the dispute with CVMs is again much lower for developing countries than for their developed 
counterparts.  
Taking into account their inability to install CVMs, the developing plaintiff might then prefer the status 
quo policy.15 Hence, the model shows that without the credible threat of facing retaliation through 
                                                          
15 For example, in the EC-Bananas case, Ecuador decided not to install CVMs on the EC, although they were 
formally allowed to do so 
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CVMs, there is little incentive for developed countries to put their policies in line with the WTO 
concessions when they are dealing with developing countries.  
Developing countries can also engage as defendants in WTO disputes. This is however less common as 
developing countries, especially the least developed among them, are not always obliged to make 
concessions and hence their policies often do not stand the scrutiny of WTO panels (their policy 
overhang makes them less likely to have to defend against a challenge). When a case against a 
developing economy is initiated, the latter once more faces certain issues. In particular, developing 
countries are more likely, once they violated the WTO provisions, to face WTO dispute settlement when 
facing a developed economy for which the initiation of such a case is not so expensive. Moreover, as 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 
is relatively high for developing countries, they are much more likely to settle before panel ruling. Table 
3 clearly demonstrates this finding, as it shows that only eight non OECD/G20 defendants have awaited 
a panel ruling. 
This is even more so as the threat of CVMs installed by the developed economy is enormous for most 
developing countries. Due to their less diversified exports and the fierce competition of other 
developing countries in their export sectors, a higher tariff installed on their exports by a major, 
developed trading partner has a detrimental effect on the developing country’s economy. In that case, 
developing economies are more likely to settle bilaterally or adhere to WTO rulings rather than setting 
their ideal policy and incurring countervailing measures. 
Table 5 indeed clearly indicates that developing country defendants shine away from CVMs. In not a 
single instance did a developing country defendant opt for CVMs rather than settlement. 
Proposition 7: As a plaintiff, developing countries are less likely to file a complaint at the WTO. This is 
due to their relatively higher cost of litigation. Moreover, developing countries can have difficulties in 
credibly threatening a developed country with CVMs, which results in fewer complaints as well. When 
establishing panels is more costly for the developing country than the developed country, settlement 
in the consultation phase is more likely for developing countries. This however provides them with a 
relatively low utility. As a defendant, the significant threat of CVMs induces developing countries to 
set their initial policies so as not to face the risk of being filed against. They are also more likely to 
settle during the consultations phase, only realizing a relatively lower utility (relative to developed 
economies). 
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In both the case of a developing country as defendant and the case of a developing country as plaintiff, 
there is one more instance where power relations can play a role. In our model we gave the defendant 
the possibility to offer a policy to the plaintiff in the consultations phase (the opposite case is described 
in appendix 1). In reality, it will be the party with the most negotiating power that ultimately benefits 
most during the settlement phases. Developing countries generally have a weaker bargaining position, 
which results in a lower pay-off from pre-panel bargaining. This is even more because the party’s costs 
are included in the outcomes of the consultations. Given that the costs for developing countries can be 
high, this results in a less beneficial consultations outcome. For more equal parties, the outcome of the 
consultations will lie somewhere in between these two extremes.  
The establishment of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) can support developing countries in 
addressing these issues. The ACWL can support developing countries during the WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings at a discounted rate. Involving the ACWL can help developing countries to 
overcome the cost of preparation of a dispute case. In such instance, the developing country benefits 
from a lower cost, and the game’s results will more closely reflect the results for a developed economy. 
However, the ACWL will not be able to help countries to overcome the problems in installing CVMs. 
Hence, for a developing country plaintiff, the ACWL might be less interesting. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper presents a spatial model that sets light on the conditions of settlement under the DSU. In 
doing so, it contributes to the academic literature by demonstrating how the cost of litigation alters the 
decisions of financially less-endowed countries in comparison to countries with more resources. 
Moreover, this papershows that policies can be inconsistent with the WTO agreements without ever 
being subject to litigation. 
The DSU is a unique dispute settlement mechanism in international relations. It allows every WTO 
member to file a complaint against any other WTO member, which will, when found guilty, have to 
reverse its policy to the one agreed upon during the WTO negotiation rounds. As such, it allows even the 
smallest WTO member to challenge a policy set by the larger WTO members, which would render all 
WTO members relatively equal in dispute settlement and rule out their power asymmetries. However, 
the model presented casts a different view. In particular, we find that the structure of the WTO dispute 
settlement results in a more subtle unequal treatment. Developing countries, less endowed with 
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financial resources, file fewer complaints than more developed WTO countries as they face a relatively 
higher litigation cost. Developing countries further have less negotiation power, and lack the ability to 
threaten a developed country with CVMs, all of which leads to a lower utility compared to developed 
countries, who have deeper pockets. Hence, the cost of litigation drives down the utility for a developing 
country both as a plaintiff and as a defendant. The problems faced by developing countries also alter 
their decisions at the different steps of WTO litigation. They are more likely to put their policies in line 
with their WTO commitments in order to deter complaints from being filed against them, and they are 
more likely to shy away from CVMs, favoring bilateral settlement instead. Developed countries, when 
trading with developing countries, can put their policies rather high before being subject to litigation. 
We further find that bilateral settlements are very common, and that CVMs are mainly favored when 
there has been extensive trade liberalization in the sector to which the dispute relates. Consequently, 
we argue that not every WTO member is equal within the WTO DSU. The ACLW can help, as it allows 
developing countries to seek legal support at a discounted rate. This might help to offset the negative 
effects of their relatively higher litigation cost, and could ensure that developing countries realize similar 
outcomes as their more developed counterparts in WTO disputes.   
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7. Appendix  
Instead of the defendant, the plaintiff can be given the privilege to draft and offer the settlement 
policies to the defendant.  
 
Post-panel judgment phase 
Let us first study the post-panel settlement offer. When the plaintiff has the privilege to draft the 
settlement offer, she will, just as when the defendant proposes the settlement policy, be unable to forge 
a settlement offer that would leave either party better off. Bilateral settlement consequently does not 
result in a higher utility for either party, but remains an alternative for both outcomes.  
 
Consultations phase 
During the consultations phase, the plaintiff can once more get the privilege to draft the settlement 
offer. Now, the settlement offer depends on the later steps in the game. When the game would 
ultimately have ended with a reversal to the WTO policy, the offer of the plaintiff to the defendant 
depends on the cost of litigation for the defendant. The striking result is that the plaintiff can even 
achieve a better outcome than the WTO policy. More specifically, she is be able to offer a 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 lower 
than 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, to the extent that 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 is larger than  −2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 + 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 . So the settlement 
policy can be up to: 
   𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 = −2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2  
This equation shows us that the plaintiff is even able to offer the defendant a policy lower than 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤. 
Moreover, it is easy to see that the plaintiff’s ability to extract additional benefits from the defendant 
depends on the cost for the defendant. The policy allowed by the WTO provisions also plays a role. The 
looser the commitments (hence higher allowed policies), the higher the settlement policy needs to be, 
which results in a lower utility for the plaintiff.  
Since this allows the plaintiff to reap some additional benefits (a lower policy than the WTO policy 
implemented) compared to the case whereby WTO litigation results in a reversal to the WTO policy, the 
plaintiff always prefers to settle bilaterally, and is always able to draft a proposal that would be accepted 
by the defendant while giving herself a higher utility than continuing the game.  
When the defendant prefers to end the game with CVMs, and the plaintiff is given the opportunity to 
draft the take it or leave it offer, she can again benefit at the expense of the defendant. In this case, the 
defendant needs to be offered a 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 such that −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)2 − �𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 � − 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 ≤ −(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)2. 
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This solves to:  −𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 ≤ 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2   
The defendant in this case can sometimes agree to a policy lower than the one committed to during the 
trade rounds at the WTO (depending on the values of 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑, 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 and 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑). More specific, a higher litigation 
cost for the defendant makes a lower settlement offer possible, whereas a higher 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 and 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 drives up 
the settlement policy, to the detriment of the plaintiff who prefers a lower settlement policy. However, 
the plaintiff only offers a settlement policy when this leaves herself better off than continuing the game. 
The utility realized when the game ends in CVMs is −𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝. Hence, settlement is preferred over 
CVMs when: 
−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 < −𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2  
−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2  
We can solve this now keeping in mind the resulting settlement offer.  
−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < −𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2  
𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < −𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝2  
Consequently, when the settlement offer gets too high, the plaintiff might prefer neglecting the 
consultations, and install CVMs in the end. Less settlement can be found when the cost for the 
defendant is lower. More settlement is possible when the cost for the plaintiff is higher, when the WTO 
policy is high, and to a lesser extent when the defendant’s initial policy is higher. Consequently, no 
settlement is found during consultations when the settlement policy is too high to offset the costs and 
benefits associated with CVMs.  
 
We can now study whether there are differences in the action probabilities depending on the actor 
making the settlement offer. 
When the plaintiff offers the consultations phase settlement policy, the resulting policy is lower than the 
one that would have been offered in the case where the defendant offers such policy, both in the case 
of a reversal to the WTO policy, as in the case of CVMs. 
When the game would have ended with CVMs, there might be  a difference in the likelihood of finding a 
settlement during the consultations phase depending on the party drafting the settlement offer. When 
the defendant offers the settlement offer, settlement is favored over CVMs when: 
𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 > 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 − 2 ∗ ��𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝� + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 
Which can be rewritten as: 
28 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 > 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 − 2 ∗ ��𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝� 
With the settlement privilege extended to the plaintiff, settlement is favored over CVMs when:  
−𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < −𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2  
Which can be rewritten as:  
𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝−𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 > −𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2  
Let us now define 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 as the litigation cost advantage of the defendant over the plaintiff, which can 
be denoted by ∆𝐶𝐶. 
Consequently, with the settlement offer drafted by the defendant:  
∆𝐶𝐶 > 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 − 2 ∗ ��𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝� 
Whereas with the settlement offer drafted by the plaintiff: 
∆𝐶𝐶 < 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑2 
These two equations show that the difference between the likelihood of settlement dependent on the 
party having the power to draft the settlement offer boils down to the settlement offers offered in both 
instances. It further depends on the realizations of the variables common to both equations (𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 ,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤). 
Structurally, there is no difference between the likelihood of settling in both instances. 
Filing decision phase 
When the plaintiff drafts the take-it-or-leave it offer, the plaintiff files more easily since the policy 
outcome will be more beneficial for him. It is however not possible to fully work out this equation. 
However, the above equations shows us that if the plaintiff drafts the settlement offer, she might get a 
very low policy in place (even lower than 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 in certain circumstances). Hence, more disputes are 
launched. 
 
Initial policy 
Due to the higher likelihood of the initiation of a dispute when the plaintiff gets to offer the settlement 
policies, the defendant has to put its policy lower. In certain cases, he might even be willing to put its 
policy lower than the one committed to over the trade liberalization round so as to be certain that 
complaints are deterred.  
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